In the ongoing conflict between Iran and its adversaries, a fascinating strategy emerges: endurance and deterrence. This approach is not about seeking conventional victory but rather about ensuring survival on Iran's terms. The Islamic Republic's leaders and commanders have been meticulously preparing for this scenario for years, understanding that their regional ambitions could lead to a direct confrontation with Israel or the US, with the potential for the other to be drawn in. This was evident in the 12-day war last summer, where Israel initiated the conflict and the US joined in later. Given the technological and military superiority of the US and Israel, it is clear that Iran's strategists are not aiming for a straightforward battlefield win. Instead, they have crafted a strategy centered around deterrence and endurance. Iran has invested significantly in layered ballistic missile capabilities, long-range drones, and a network of allied armed groups across the region over the past decade. This strategy is underpinned by a deep understanding of Iran's limitations. While US mainland territory is out of reach, American bases in neighboring Arab countries are within range. Similarly, Israel is well within the range of Iranian missiles and drones, and recent exchanges have shown that its air defense systems can be breached, carrying significant psychological weight. Iran's approach is also economically driven. Interceptors used by Israel and the US are far more expensive than the one-way drones and missiles deployed by Iran. This means that prolonged conflict forces the US and Israel to deplete their high-value assets to intercept these low-cost threats. Energy is another critical lever in this war economy. The Strait of Hormuz, a crucial chokepoint for oil and gas shipments, can be leveraged by Iran to raise the cost of the conflict. Even credible threats and limited disruptions have already pushed prices up and may increase international pressure for de-escalation. In this context, escalation becomes a tool not to defeat Iran's opponents militarily but to increase the cost of the war. Attacks on neighboring countries, such as Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Oman, and Iraq, are designed to signal the risks of hosting US forces. Tehran may hope that these governments will pressure Washington to limit or halt operations, but this is a risky gambit. Expanding attacks risks hardening hostility and pushing these states further into the US-Israel camp, with long-term consequences that could outlast the war itself, reshaping regional alignments and leaving Iran more isolated. If survival is the primary objective, then widening the circle of enemies is a high-stakes move. However, from Tehran's perspective, restraint may also be risky if it signals weakness. Reports of local commanders selecting targets or launching missiles with relative autonomy raise further questions. If accurate, this could indicate the decentralization of command structures to ensure continuity under heavy attack. Iran's military doctrine, particularly within the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC), has long incorporated decentralized elements to maintain operational continuity. Communication networks are vulnerable to interception and jamming, and senior commanders have been targeted. Air superiority by the US and Israel limits central oversight, making pre-authorized target lists and delegated launch authority deliberate safeguards against decapitation. This structure may explain how Iranian forces have continued operating after the killing of senior IRGC figures and even after the assassination of Ali Khamenei, Iran's supreme leader and commander-in-chief, in the opening US-Israeli strikes. However, decentralization carries risks. Local commanders acting with incomplete information may strike unintended targets, including neighboring states that had sought neutrality. The absence of a unified operational picture increases the probability of miscalculation and could result in the loss of command and control. Ultimately, Iran's strategy appears to be based on the belief that it can endure punishment longer than its adversaries are willing to sustain pain and costs. If this is the case, it is a calculated form of escalation: endure, retaliate, avoid total collapse, and wait for political fractures to emerge on the other side. Yet endurance has limits. Missile stockpiles are limited, production lines are under constant attack, and replacing mobile launchers takes time. The same logic applies to Iran's opponents. Israel has not been able to rely completely on its air defense systems, and each breach amplifies public anxiety. The US must balance regional escalation, energy market volatility, and the financial burden of sustained operations. Both sides seem to assume that time favors them, but this cannot be the case. In this war, the Islamic Republic does not need triumph; it needs to remain standing. Whether this objective is achievable without permanently alienating its neighbors remains the unanswered question.
